Key Points
- Although Xi Jinping’s September visit to the United States produced few concrete results, both sides may see value in continued dialogue as a means of managing crises.
- Xi, who often invokes the “Thucydides Trap,” appears acutely conscious of the prospect of a rising China overtaking a declining United States. We should bear in mind that his view of the world may differ markedly from our own.
- President Trump’s critical stance toward “Taiwan independence” may reassure China, but it could also increase the risk of a Taiwan contingency—either by sacrificing Taiwan’s interests or by encouraging Beijing to assume that “Trump will not defend Taiwan.”
The Thucydides Trap: President Xi Jinping’s Worldview
During his state visit to the United States from September 23 to 25, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated—following the U.S.–China summit in Beijing in May—that the two countries can overcome the Thucydides Trap. The Thucydides Trap is Graham Allison’s concept that war is more likely to break out between a rising power and a ruling one. Viewed alongside Xi’s favored characterization of the era—“the East rising, the West declining” (dongsheng xijiang)—the Thucydides Trap brings his worldview into sharper relief: China will soon overtake the United States and emerge as the world’s hegemon.
Xi’s visit, which began with President Trump and the first lady greeting him at the airport, had all the hallmarks of “hospitality diplomacy,” putting Trump’s instincts as a businessman on full display. Feted as “a great leader leading a great country,” Xi appeared to savor the atmosphere of U.S.–China friendship while reinforcing his conviction that the international order is undergoing a “once-in-a-century” shift—one in which China has become a great power standing on equal footing with the United States.
Behind this outward display of friendship, China’s view of the United States is fundamentally negative. To China, the United States is both the hegemon that built what it regards as an unjust postwar international order and its greatest threat—a country that, in Beijing’s view, has repeatedly interfered in China’s internal affairs. Before his visit, Xi delivered speeches at the SCO Plus Summit and the BRICS Summit in which he did not name the United States directly. But his calls for non-interference in internal affairs, adherence to international law, sovereign equality, the peaceful resolution of disputes, an end to double standards, and greater solidarity among countries of the Global South amounted to an open challenge to U.S. hegemony.
It is easy to point out the deceptive elements of this Chinese narrative, but the fact that many people believe it may itself be an “inconvenient truth” for us. A July 2026 Pew Research Center survey found that China was viewed more favorably than the United States in 26 of 36 countries, while majorities in 24 countries—including Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia—considered Xi more “trustworthy” than Trump. Moreover, a Chicago Council survey shows that Americans’ views of China have improved markedly over the past two years. Against this backdrop, Japan and Taiwan are increasingly outliers in their views of China.
Together, the United States and China account for 42% of world GDP; both are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and both rank among the world’s most powerful military powers. Despite its pronounced economic slowdown, China has maintained political and social stability through surveillance and rule by fear, even as international views of the country have become more favorable. Trump, by contrast, faces low approval ratings ahead of the midterm elections and has been unable to end the war in the Middle East, while his unpredictability continues to generate unease. The world Xi sees may therefore look very different from the one we see. This is important to bear in mind when considering China’s approach to the Taiwan question.
The Results of Xi’s Visit
Miles Yu (Yu Maochun), who served as an adviser to the Secretary of State during the Trump administration, has characterized the summit’s main agenda in terms of the “Four T’s”—Trade, Taiwan, Tehran (Iran), and Technology—with Truce added as a “fifth T.” Concrete outcomes included a two-month extension of the trade-war “truce,” reciprocal tariff cuts worth $30 billion, Chinese purchases of U.S. coal, the launch of a U.S.–China Trade Committee, the establishment of a U.S.–China AI dialogue and hotline, and the lease of pandas. However, on Iran, the two sides went no further than the language used during Trump’s visit to China in May, and no agreement on the Taiwan question was announced. The prevailing assessment in Japan, the United States, and Taiwan is likely that the substantive results were limited despite the lavish reception.
On the other hand, the resumption of leader-level discussions on crisis-management cooperation in traditional security fields is noteworthy. The U.S. side raised U.S.–China–Russia arms-control negotiations, while China announced that talks on a U.S.–China military crisis-management communication memorandum would be accelerated.
The two leaders agreed to meet again at the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November and the G20 in Miami in December. The latest summit was therefore only the second in a series of four meetings. A broader deal, potentially including the Taiwan question, could still emerge from the third or fourth meeting. At the same time, Secretary of State Rubio has stressed that it is precisely because serious disagreements remain between the two countries that the U.S. government has a responsibility to maintain dialogue with China. In other words, the Trump administration’s approach to managing relations with China appears to be shifting its emphasis from maximizing gains through deals toward avoiding and managing crises. This approach has much in common with the previous Biden administration’s emphasis on “guardrails,” and both sides may therefore view continued dialogue itself as an important means of managing crises. This perspective is particularly important when considering the implications of U.S.–China relations for Taiwan.
Implications for the Taiwan Question
President Xi urged the U.S. side to “hold firmly to the correct position of opposing Taiwan independence,” but the two governments’ announcements made no mention of Taiwan, and President Trump said only that “President Xi understands my thinking very well.” Just after his own visit to China in May, President Trump made remarks to the effect that he did not want the United States to go to war over the Taiwan Strait, 9,500 miles away, because of a push for Taiwan independence, and that arms supplies to Taiwan were a good bargaining chip with China. “Not supporting Taiwan independence” has indeed been the consistent position of successive U.S. administrations, while “strategic ambiguity” over how the United States would respond to a Taiwan contingency has, for now, been maintained. Yet no U.S. president has reacted so negatively to “Taiwan independence” since President Bush during the Chen Shui-bian administration.
The Chinese side, for its part, likely came away from the May summit with the impression that Trump has an interest in deterring Taiwan independence. This assessment is based on several factors: Foreign Minister Wang Yi said just after the May meeting that the U.S. side “gave the sense that it does not support, and will not accept, Taiwan moving toward independence”; Xi spoke this time of “opposing Taiwan independence” as though it were Trump’s own thinking; and several senior Chinese scholars of Taiwan interpreted Trump’s May remarks as “suggesting opposition to Taiwan independence.” The Taiwan question may have received relatively little attention at this summit because the Chinese side considered it sufficient simply to confirm the shared understanding reached in May.
Trump administration officials stress that “U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed,” but subtle shifts are emerging not only in the president’s rhetoric but also in the administration’s Taiwan policy. Approval of an arms package for Taiwan has been postponed, and President Lai Ching-te has not transited through the U.S. mainland for nearly two and a half years. At least until the G20, there is likely to be a strong inclination to avoid statements or actions that might provoke China. In this environment, even a misjudged nuance in President Lai’s National Day speech on October 10 could be exploited to drive a wedge between the United States and Taiwan. At the APEC summit in Shenzhen, the customary U.S.–Taiwan bilateral meeting may not take place, and this U.S. posture will also indirectly affect Japan’s revision of its “three strategic documents.”
The danger of the Trump administration’s Taiwan policy lies in the fact that the concept of “Taiwan independence” has no shared definition, and China effectively claims the authority to define it. For example, China condemned then–House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as “a mistaken signal to Taiwan independence forces” and responded with large-scale military exercises. Yet there is no logical link between Pelosi’s visit and “Taiwan independence.” Likewise, there is no causal link between whether President Lai transits through Miami or New York and the prospect of Taiwan independence. In effect, what China is willing to accept determines the boundaries of what counts as “Taiwan independence” That the Japanese government has in recent years refrained from statements such as “not supporting Taiwan independence” is probably intended to avoid giving the Chinese side room to interpret the term expansively. Trump, by contrast, has little interest in defining terms precisely and is easily swayed by the Chinese narrative. If the Chinese side criticizes arms supplies or Taiwanese statements and actions as fostering “Taiwan independence,” he may postpone arms supplies and press Taiwan to make concessions.
Given the risks and costs of using force, Xi’s leadership is likely to continue pursuing peaceful unification, even if it takes time. But a U.S. president’s willingness to defend Taiwan remains a critical factor in that calculation. If Xi concludes that “President Trump would try to avoid a war with China, but the next president may not,” the possibility that he might seek to resolve the Taiwan question during the Trump administration cannot be ruled out. Should concerns over Xi’s health compound these pressures, the risk would rise further. Stability in U.S.–China relations may give Xi greater psychological latitude and help deter rash action, but if mishandled, it could deepen his conviction that “Trump will not defend Taiwan” and, conversely, heighten the risk of a Taiwan contingency. In this regard, Prime Minister Takaichi and Foreign Minister Motegi deserve high praise for having raised these concerns with the U.S. government ahead of Xi’s visit.
The day after the summit, Trump predicted on social media that “tremendous things” would happen between the United States and China. Xi is growing more confident in the idea of “the East rising, the West declining” and in the prospect of a “U.S.–China G2.” If deterring “Taiwan independence” becomes central to U.S.–China crisis management, while China retains the power to determine what counts as a move toward “Taiwan independence,” then the sixth “T” in U.S.–China relations—Tremendous Things—is hardly a desirable prospect for Taiwan. Even if Xi’s visit proves to have been “much ado about nothing,” there is still no room for complacency, and the diplomatic capabilities of Taiwan and Japan are being put to the test.
*The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of any organization, including the institution with which the author is affiliated.
(c) Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok
