The Structural Transformation of the Middle Eastern Order：From Overlapping Confrontations to “Managed Competition”

Key Points

1. Behind the Hormuz crisis lies a structural change in the United States itself—what might be called a process of “de-Americanization,” as Washington moves away from its role as a hegemon that underwrites global sea lanes and regional order and places greater priority on its own resources, industries, and markets.
2. Many of the overlapping confrontations that once divided the Middle East have, at least on the surface, eased considerably. What matters is not that these conflicts have disappeared, but that the parties now have more channels through which to avoid direct confrontation. The region’s most dangerous flashpoint, however—the confrontation between Iran and Israel—remains inadequately managed.
3. Rather than turning away from the United States, Middle Eastern countries are broadening their diplomatic and security options through engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS+, maritime defense cooperation, and other initiatives.  The region is gradually moving toward an order in which regional countries assume greater responsibility for regional problems. This shift offers a useful indication of how regional orders elsewhere may evolve as the United States—the country that underwrote post–Cold War globalization—turns increasingly inward.

The first installment of this series examined Saudi Arabia’s geographic advantages; the second, the vulnerabilities of Japan’s supply chains; and the third, the dilemma facing countries that host U.S. military bases. Viewed together, these issues show how the Hormuz crisis reflects both the wavering of the conventional structure by which the United States underwrote the Middle Eastern order and the rising autonomy of the region’s countries.

As the assumption that the United States single-handedly underwrites the world’s sea lanes and regional order becomes less certain, the countries of the Middle East are not discarding the United States but seeking to move beyond an era in which they relied on Washington alone for their security. Engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS+, non-aggression frameworks, and maritime defense cooperation are all part of an effort to expand their diplomatic and security options.

In an age when every country is compelled to redefine its strategy for energy, food, ports, finance, and security, the shift now under way in the Middle East—from overlapping confrontations to managed competition—may become a leading example of the changes in order that could arise in other regions as well.

When the United States Turns Inward

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has acted as a sea power that commands the world’s oceans, protects the flow of energy, and provides security to its allies. Since the shale revolution, however, the United States has greatly reduced its dependence on Middle Eastern energy and has become the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States has been a net energy exporter overall since 2019. In agriculture, too, the United States is one of the world’s foremost exporters. For a country that can supply its own energy and food, the strategic necessity of defending distant seas is no longer as self-evident as it once was.

Seen in broad terms, the United States itself had begun to change the nature of its global engagement even before the countries of the Middle East began to reassess their relationship with Washington. This is, in effect, America’s own de-globalization, or “de-Americanization.” Here, “de-Americanization” refers to a shift in the U.S. center of gravity—from a hegemon that supplies international public goods to a state that, centered on the American continent, protects its own resources, industries, borders, and markets. The phrase MAGA (Make America Great Again) captures that change succinctly.

When the United States—the most powerful sea power in the postwar world—begins to shift its center of gravity back toward the American continent, those most affected are the peripheries where land power and sea power meet. These are the spaces once called the “Rimland” in geopolitics—the Middle East, the Black Sea coast, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea coast, the area around the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait, among others—where much tension has long been concentrated.

If U.S. engagement in these peripheries recedes in relative terms, the region’s own countries will have no choice but to take on a greater role in managing their security. A country cannot relocate its headquarters as a company can. It is therefore difficult, in practice, either to break off completely with a neighbor or to make an enemy disappear. Over the past decade, the Middle East has been searching for a regional order under precisely such constraints.

Where Have the Middle East’s Overlapping Confrontations Gone?

Looking back over the past decade shows how much the Middle East has changed. Ten years ago, multiple conflicts and civil wars overlapped across the region.

At the time, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) controlled extensive territory, while the Syrian civil war, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Yemeni civil war, the Saudi–Iranian rupture, the split in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) caused by the Qatar crisis, the Saudi–Turkish confrontation, the proxy war in Libya, and the confrontations involving Israel and Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas were all occurring at once (Table 1). In the Middle East and surrounding regions, a pattern of “overlapping confrontations” had emerged that could not be captured by any single axis.

As Table 1 shows, in Afghanistan the U.S. military withdrawal removed one of the parties to the conflict. Between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between Turkey and the major Arab states, and in the Qatar crisis, Yemen, and Libya, the axes of confrontation that once divided the region have, at least on the surface, eased considerably. Differences of interest and the problem of proxy forces have not, of course, disappeared. Even so, what the countries are now moving toward is not renewed confrontation but the maintenance of channels of dialogue and coordination that allow them to avoid a head-on collision.

Table 1: Major Conflicts and Challenges in the Middle East (Selected)

Source: Compiled by the author

The Greatest Remaining Flashpoint: Iran and Israel

It is, of course, too early to describe these changes as reconciliation. Saudi–Iranian relations have improved, but the two countries’ interests are not fully aligned. The region’s other countries, too, maintain multiple diplomatic, commercial, and security relationships in parallel while holding mutually divergent interests.

The UAE deepened its ties with Israel by normalizing relations in 2020, while also maintaining commercial relations with Iran. Qatar, which hosts a U.S. military base, maintains channels of dialogue with the Taliban, Iran, and Hamas. Oman has served as a mediator between the United States and Iran. What matters is not the resolution of conflict but the increase in channels that make its management possible.

Within that landscape, the greatest confrontation that remains unresolved is that between Iran and Israel. Spanning multiple domains—proxy forces, nuclear development, missiles, air defense, cyber, and the straits—the confrontation has escalated into a crisis for the region as a whole. The regional non-aggression framework for the Middle East that Saudi Arabia was reported to be considering must also be understood in this context. Its aim is not immediate reconciliation. It is to incorporate Iran—which, even under military pressure, can still unsettle the regional order through the straits, proxy forces, missiles, and diplomacy—into the rules of the regional order rather than to exclude it. The Hormuz crisis has once again thrown into relief how such unresolved confrontations can escalate to the point of unsettling the order of maritime traffic, and the consequent need to manage confrontation within a regional framework.

Managing Confrontation

The Hormuz crisis remains, for now, in an unstable phase. While military tension continues between the United States and Iran, there are also moves to view Hormuz not as a passage that the United States defends from the outside, but as a place where the littoral states—Iran and Oman—develop rules for its management under international law and in consultation with neighboring countries. The question is not only “whether the strait opens or closes.” Even if ships can pass, that alone does not make a supply chain function. A supply chain functions only when insurance coverage is available, ports accept cargo, buyers have confidence, and navies provide escort. The longer the crisis lasts, the more the rules of ship passage, the actors that guarantee safety, and the very framework for coordinating the order of maritime traffic become points of contention.

“Management” here does not mean that a single referee adjudicates the confrontation. Rather, it refers to a situation in which the parties to a confrontation maintain several parallel channels that allow them to avoid direct confrontation. The mediating functions of Oman and Qatar noted above, the record of China’s mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the differences of position within the GCC, and the economic ties that make a complete rupture difficult—these function as mechanisms not for “eliminating” confrontation but for “preventing it from crossing a critical threshold.” In the current Hormuz crisis, too, if the channels of dialogue and mediation between the United States and Iran grow thin, the crisis could easily cross that line.

Spillover to the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait

The crisis is not confined to Hormuz. Since July, the Houthis’ declaration of a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia—the Houthis being backed by Iran—and Saudi Arabia’s military response have coincided, raising tensions in the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait as well. How to secure multiple transport routes, and how to use them selectively—including the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Suez Canal, and overland and maritime alternative corridors running from the Gulf toward the Mediterranean—has become an increasingly important question.

It is too early, however, to read the Houthi declaration as an outright, total closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Actually closing the strait for a prolonged period would turn not only Saudi Arabia but many countries—Egypt, European states, India, and China—into adversaries. For the Houthis, creating the perception that the strait “might be blockaded” may carry greater strategic value than actually blockading it. That alone can affect insurance premiums and route selection, and force Saudi Arabia and the United States to consider the additional costs of responding.

Such brinkmanship has its limits, however. If a Houthi miscalculation coincides with a breakdown of Saudi restraint, the risk of an actual suspension of passage remains. “Managed competition” is an equilibrium premised on the parties maintaining a degree of rationality and restraint.

Strong Words, but the Line Stays Open

In the Middle East, confrontations often look larger than they are. Leaders use strong language, the media emphasize hostility, and diplomatic distance is deliberately signaled. Behind the scenes, however, negotiation, mediation, money, logistics, investment, and the movement of people continue without interruption. Strong words, but the line stays open. Flags are waved, but commerce continues.

In the third installment of this series, we treated security as a combination of DIME—Diplomacy, Information and Influence, Military, and Economic power—and argued that U.S. military bases and interceptor missiles alone cannot manage a crisis. The Gulf states seek to ensure their security not through military means alone but through a combination of several instruments: reducing enemies through diplomacy, softening hostility toward themselves through information and influence, limiting damage through air defense, and preserving points of contact with their counterparts through the economy.

That Saudi Arabia positions itself in its Vision 2030 strategy as “the center of the Arab and Islamic world,” “an investment powerhouse,” and “a hub connecting three continents” can also be understood within this current. Strengthening its functions as a hub for the economy, religion, logistics, and culture overlaps with the effort to expand its diplomatic and security options.

The Region Takes On the Region’s Problems

If the changes so far are summed up in a phrase, it is this: regional problems for regional countries to address, and national problems for each country to address itself. To call this movement simply “moving away from the United States” would be to misread its essence. The countries of the Middle East are not trying to discard the United States. While maintaining their relationship with a United States that is pursuing “de-Americanization,” they are seeking to increase both their role in shaping the regional order and their own strategic autonomy.

That movement is also apparent at the institutional level. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Iran has become a full member, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey are engaged as dialogue partners. In the BRICS+ context as well, Iran, the UAE, and Egypt have joined, and Saudi Arabia has continued to engage as an invited country.

More recently, reports have emerged of Saudi-led multilateral consultations in Riyadh on maritime security in the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, as well as efforts to advance maritime defense cooperation with Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, and others. The trilateral consultations among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan point in the same direction. Their effectiveness remains to be seen, but what matters is that the region itself is seeking to expand its options rather than leaving the security of the seas and trade routes to the United States.

It would not, of course, be appropriate to see engagement with the SCO or BRICS+ as the formation of a military alliance. In the current crisis, too, China and Russia have maintained their relations with Iran while holding to a cautious stance on direct military support. Nor do the countries of the Middle East wish to join any single camp. Rather, they are seeking to secure as many diplomatic and security options as possible that can be used even in a crisis.

The Unwinding of Globalization

The globalization of the post–Cold War era rested on the freedom of the seas, the dollar, finance, and open markets that the United States underwrote. In that world, companies increasingly became the ones to “choose countries.” Companies compared corporate tax rates, regulations, labor costs, and the quality of port infrastructure across countries, and moved wherever conditions were most favorable for business. States lowered taxes, eased regulation, and built infrastructure in order to attract companies. This was the so-called “race to the bottom.”

What is happening now is an unwinding of that model. The very United States that underwrote globalization has begun to return its center of gravity inward. The drive to place energy, ports, data, minerals, food, technology, and corporate activity once again within one’s own national strategy is intensifying. Rather than the world simply closing, states are seeking to move from accepting the conditions of globalization to playing a greater role in shaping them.

At the root of that shift is the state’s basic responsibility to ensure stable supplies of energy and food and to sustain industry and the lives of its people even in an emergency. How to secure access to fuel, food, fertilizer, minerals, and logistics has become a central issue of diplomacy and security.

The countries of the Middle East recognized this change early on. They are seeking to convert their ports, resources, capital, and cities into diplomatic and economic bargaining assets. Saudi Arabia’s strategic reappraisal of the Red Sea, the UAE’s strengthening of its port and financial functions, and Qatar’s use of natural gas and mediation diplomacy can all be positioned as moves to convert their own resources and functions into bargaining power.

This movement is not confined to the Middle East. Immediately after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, 141 countries voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, while 52 countries either voted against the resolution, abstained, or were absent. Much of the reporting presented this as evidence of Russia’s isolation, but the latter 52 included China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and by population they accounted for more than half of the world’s population. The international community looks different when viewed in terms of the number of states than when viewed in terms of population, resources, logistics, and growth markets.

The countries of the Middle East watch this reality closely. More than their choice of camp, their ability to continue converting their ports, resources, capital, and cities into bargaining assets will shape their national power in the years ahead.

The New Order Is Emerging in the Middle East

A country that is strong in a crisis is not one that remains untouched by it. Rather, it is a country that has several exits, speaks with several counterparts, connects to several institutions, and can preserve its options when a crisis arises.

What is happening in the Middle East is not merely a “distant regional conflict”; it holds important implications for thinking about the international order to come. In an age when the United States, once the world’s most powerful sea power, recedes in relative terms and each region has no choice but to take on its own security and supply chains, that transformation of the regional order is becoming visible first in the Middle East.

What the Hormuz crisis reveals is not so much the collapse of the Middle Eastern order as the emerging rules of a new one. The region is moving from overlapping rivalries toward “managed competition,” while assuming greater responsibility for managing its own problems. What appears to be disorder in the Middle East may, in fact, offer an early glimpse of the transformation now beginning to reshape the wider international order.

*The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of any organization, including the institution with which the author is affiliated.

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